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Abstract: In the spectrum sections of its "Proposed Changes" to the Review of the 
European Union Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and 
Services, the European Commission establishes a coherent, comprehensive and original 
set of forward-looking spectrum policy principles. By emphasising the role of trading and 
market flexibility, technology and service neutrality, it departs from traditional, 
administrative spectrum management principles. But by stressing the need for a clear 
justification of exclusive usage rights, it differentiates itself from market-fits all 
propositions. Three issues should be examined to understand what kind of evolutions 
could occur: the prevention of interferences, harmonisation and standardisation, and lastly 
the weight of institutions. Technical progress in wireless, culminating in extended dynamic 
access, will mostly complement market mechanisms in fostering the efficient use of 
spectrum, as long as institutional factors do not interfere (barriers to entry) or are 
removed. 
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n the spectrum sections of its "Proposed Changes" 1 to the Review of 
the European Union Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services, the European Commission 
establishes a coherent, comprehensive and original set of forward-looking 
spectrum policy principles. By emphasising the role of trading and market 
flexibility, technology and service neutrality, it departs from traditional, 
administrative spectrum management principles. But by stressing the need 
for a clear justification of exclusive usage rights, it differentiates itself from 
market-fits all propositions from overseas.  
I 
                     
1 Brussels, 29.6.2006  COM(2006) 334 final, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, on the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework for electronic 
communications networks and services. 
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This paper focuses on what remains to be clarified and what roadblocks 
must be circumvented for this framework to be properly implemented and 
provide the positive results that can be expected. 
Only a minority of EU member states have already embraced the 
flexibility through market perspective. The majority still think three issues 
justify preserving the status quo, or only minor departures from it. Those 
issues are: 
- the prevention of interferences, 
- the prevalence of harmonisation and standardisation, 
- the overarching weight of institutions. 
Those issues translate into general policy principles, which have to be 
surveyed in conjunction with critical industrial choices, not foreclosing more 
long-term technology considerations, and their impact on spectrum usage 
and management. 
To begin with, the Commission makes it clear (ibid. p. 12) that: 
 "[…] to require that the granting of exclusive usage rights on the basis 
of individual licences [must] be subject to clear justification that the risk 
of harmful interference cannot be managed in another way".  
The problem is that a clear and comprehensive view of interference 
prevention, what is possible and what is not, based on existing and future 
probable technologies, is still lacking. Status quo proponents have a field 
day arguing that a structured frequency allocation is needed, as no wide-
ranging tested alternative has been demonstrated. As long as the 
interference issue has not been settled, this will remain a major roadblock 
obstructing the concrete application of the framework and confining it to the 
level of abstract management principles. 
Let us consider harmonisation and standardisation (H & S) issues. The 
principle of technological neutrality in the "Proposed Changes" (3.1 p. 13) is 
subject to limits like avoiding harmful interferences. Additional exceptions, 
"would need to be strictly justified on the basis of a limited number of 
legitimate general interest objectives". The words harmonisation and 
standardisation do not even appear in the paragraph. In the past, however, 
harmonisation and standardisation have been at the root of the major 
successes of EU initiatives. Many in the industry and EU governments, 
consider that the road should not be closed to such initiatives in the future. 
The absence of reference, in general or by name, to such possibilities, 
appears to be a crime de lese-majesté to those who think that it is in the 
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interest of the European industry to harmonise and standardise. The 
Commission's proposition regarding spectrum appears, in this respect, to be 
a complete reversal in attitude, which neglects what has made the European 
industry successful. The industry's posture would seem more realistic if it 
had come up with credible plans for future technologies in need of H & S, 
and not only for preserving and erecting barriers around existing ones. Yet 
the Commission's case would be even stronger if it were able to identify –
even restrictively – areas for H & S, and having achieved this, leave the rest 
to technology neutrality.  
Let us not forget that the Commission is also constantly confronted by 
issues of an institutional nature. The most notable example is provided by 
the audiovisual industry, and its dealing with the onslaught of telecoms 
players on TV on mobile. 
The audiovisual and telecoms industries both have an eye on the 
hundreds of millions of paying customers to be reached by TV on mobile 
terminals, and on the revenue stream that they may generate. However, the 
telecom industry feels fairly constrained in its spectrum occupancy in that 
respect, both in terms of bandwidth and ever-higher frequencies. Telecom 
players would be willing to consider the more amenable TV frequencies fair 
game for their TV on mobile developments.  
This leads us to the definitely long-term considerations. The excessively 
repeated invocation of spectrum "scarcity" actually reflects three sets of 
limiting factors.  
Firstly, our technical ability to use spectrum efficiently. Technologies have 
made enormous progress in recent years, driven both by the economic 
necessities of the extension of commercial spectrum usage and by the 
hugely increased data transmission and integration needs of the military. 
Spectrum sharing has been a reality for a while, as has dynamic access (in 
GSM for instance). It will expand, as will software defined and cognitive 
radio, culminating 10-15 years from now, in an extension of dynamic access 
to ever-larger bands and across technologies and services. Technical 
limiting factors will never completely disappear, but spectrum efficiency 
should be hugely improved. 
Secondly, administrative and economic institutions, how usage rights, in 
the form of property rights or not, are assigned and handled, can also be 
more or less efficient, and this constitutes a limiting factor. It appears, and 
this lesson has been learnt at a high price, that market mechanisms, under 
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the watch of public interest, public goods and competition monitoring, are 
most often more efficient than administrative mechanisms. Competition 
monitoring here includes provisions that barriers to entry which are 
impossible to surmount are not created by the assignment processes 
themselves. Economically driven players will have an incentive to use 
spectrum efficiently, unless institutions allow them do otherwise. It would be 
naïve to forget, based on our experience of human and corporate behaviour, 
that once exclusive property rights are established, they will be all the more 
harshly defended at an institutional level, that they are not economically 
justified. Consequently, and as a matter of efficiency and realism, every time 
that a "sharing" or "open spectrum" solution of any kind seems technically 
feasible, it should be preferred to any other solution.  
Like technology, but subject to slower processes, administrative and 
economic institutions also make progress. Vast and notable change 
processes have been cleverly handled: spectrum re-farming and relocation 
operations have been efficiently and quietly carried out. Technical neutrality 
is no longer a rarity in newly issued authorisations. Service neutrality is 
making a closely watched appearance, while trading is being progressively 
introduced. Spectrum institutions, however, are anxious not to disrupt the 
delicate functioning of the huge and complex multiple operations of wireless 
devices and services. Some spectrum agencies may perhaps be more 
optimistic than others in their administrative and technical ability to navigate 
the seas, once the Pandora's box of market winds has been opened. 
However, the point is that a process has been launched. Flexibility is on the 
way, and will undoubtedly gain momentum as the outcome of the whole set 
of "flexibility" tools being implemented is observed and assessed. The next 
steps of spectrum management evolution will be determined not by ideology 
or reference to theoretical principles, but by experience. 
Third and lastly, broader, society level, institutional factors are to be 
considered. For the sake of brevity, let's cite an example from large 
spectrum holders. The arguments put forward by TV channels for large and 
near-free spectrum holdings include the role they play in social and cultural 
diversity and their general interest obligations. These are strong 
requirements to be respected. Yet it remains to be seen whether this will be 
enough to retain their whole frequency domain in the digital transition. Past 
governments have been able to exert more leverage on the powerful Houses 
of Television than expected, as seen in the earlier stage of analogue to 
digital transition. Yet whether this leverage will be enlightened, rational, and 
powerful enough to examine the social role, and general interest obligations 
of television – and, consequently, to define the conditions and extent of its 
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legitimate access to spectrum – is hard to tell. In this process, a global view 
of the multiple diffusion channels on fixed sets: digital terrestrial, DSL, cable, 
satellite, would definitely be called for and can be suggested, but this is a 
very long shot. 
At a policy level, the spectrum community will then consider the outcome 
of the Electronic Communications Review, and how far the Commission, 
which has made Spectrum a central issue, will have been able to exert its 
leverage to implement its trading and liberalisation agenda. The 
Constitutional Treaty failure has not created a favourable background for 
strong Community initiatives, and the Commission is fighting uphill battles in 
many areas. The morose economic environment and low average growth in 
many big EU member states favour defensive postures where dynamic 
impulses are, in fact, needed. Notwithstanding, the Review and subsequent 
revised Framework Directives will represent a step forward in the direction of 
a simpler, streamlined, environment for communications services of all 
kinds. The revision of ICT policy principles is expected to climax in autumn 
2006 and the resulting platform should then be expected to be in place then 
for a while until major shifts occur at political level (fresh momentum for the 
Union?) or economic level (a new growth cycle?).  
To conclude, it appears technical progress in wireless, culminating in 
extended dynamic access, will mostly complement market mechanisms in 
fostering the efficient use of spectrum, on the condition that institutional 
factors do not interfere (barriers to entry) or are removed. In this sense, 
there is a good chance that the curse of spectrum scarcity can be lifted or 
alleviated, with the notable consequence that speeches on spectrum will 
have to find another opening argument. 
 
